Response to Steven Lubet: A Reaction:  Stand Up, Your Father [A Lawyer] is Passing by Powell, Burnele V.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 6 
1999 
Response to Steven Lubet: A Reaction: "Stand Up, Your Father [A 
Lawyer] is Passing" 
Burnele V. Powell 
University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Legal 
Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burnele V. Powell, Response to Steven Lubet: A Reaction: "Stand Up, Your Father [A Lawyer] is Passing", 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss6/6 
 
This Classic Revisited is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
A REACTION: "STAND UP, 
YOUR FATHER [A LAWYER] IS PASSING" 
Bumele V. Powell* 
Professor Steven Lubet's review examines in the lawyering 
context the truth of Due de La Rochefoucauld's observation that 
"[o]ur virtues are mostly but vices in disguise."1 His question -
one going to the very heart of what lawyering is about - asks read­
ers of To Kill a Mockingbird whether they would be equally pre­
pared to accept the fictional Atticus Fmch as the personification of 
the good lawyer if his black client, defendant Tom Robinson, actu­
ally committed the rape of the white woman, Mayella Ewell, for 
which he was charged. If Robinson was a rapist, how then does one 
square Atticus's aggressive blame-the-victim defense with his 
heroic, defender-of-the-innocent personae? 
Asked this way, the issue is essentially the one posed rhetori­
cally some time ago by Professor Wasserstrom: Why is it so plausi­
ble to talk about the amorality of the lawyer who represents all 
clients irrespective of their moral character?2 
· 
One answer, of course, is the one that is scoffed at as little more 
than a rationalization by Wasserstrom3 and marginalized as belong­
ing to the "adversary system purist" by Professor Lubet4• In the 
harshest view, what is said to be involved is a willingness of lawyers, 
like actors cast in leading roles, to play the role of advocates. Like 
Gregory Peck, Robert Duvall, Harrison Ford, Richard Gere, or Ian 
McGlothlen, lawyers are amoral participants in a theatrical social 
production called a criminal trial. The play is the thing. They are 
divorced from moral, ethical, or social accountability for their 
amoral soliloquies. Their courtroom posturing is tolerated because 
under our system, the lawyer's duty is, by definition, to play the role 
of the zealous advocate for his clients.5 
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More sympathetically stated, a close variant of this view does. 
not deny the moral, ethical, and social dilemma in which lawyers 
who defend the "indefensible" must find themselves. In this view, 
however, lawyers who commit to the representation of the unholy 
criminal defendant know in their heart of hearts that they are doing 
wrong, but accept a sort of social pass. They are not to be held 
answerable for their hypocritical advancing of arguments that serve 
their clients, regardless of the conflicts posed by their personal 
moral, and ethical views, because, as a society, we have asked them, 
and ourselves, to refrain from such condemnations. 6 
Lubet's critique of Atticus Finch, however, prompts a third, and 
I think ultimately more satisfying answer. Whether Atticus is seen 
through his daughter's loving eyes or Lubet's reconstruction 
through cross-examination, an underlying truth remains: There is 
simply nothing immoral, amoral, or hypocritical about good people 
advancing interests that are incidentally shared by bad people. 
Moreover, to the extent that a good person would be a good lawyer� 
attorneys must, by definition, maintain fealty to a code of profes­
sional behavior that is uniquely demanding. That code, in large 
part because it has been established through open and critical pub­
lic debate, however, leaves little room to maneuver on many of the 
most important moral and social concerns of the day. Thus, the 
challenge is that it commands adherence by lawyers to demanding 
and often intentionally self-critical standards. In this sense, the law­
yer, like Atticus Finch, who continuously acts to uphold principle -
especially in the face of public disapprobation - has by any wor­
thy definition acted heroically on behalf of his client, the judicial 
system, and the larger society. 
This is not to argue that the lawyer who satisfies this - shall we 
say, democratic - description of heroic lawyering obviates the pos­
sibly related need to answer for his or her moral obligations. It 
concedes only that whatever the strength of the moral claims, they 
rest on a priori assumptions that would necessarily force any exami­
nation of a lawyer's ethics outside the practical range of public 
discussion.1 
Confronted, though, as an issue of public discussion - one in 
which we can confront head-on the kinds of questions that Lubet 
raises precisely because the democratic process has, or has not, 
anticipated their interjection - our critique can be as starkly stated 
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he 
may bring upon others.'" Id. at 1355-56. (quoting TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 {1821)). 
6. See MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 3 {1997); MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 {1980). 
7. See Burnele Venable Powell, Risking the Terrible Question of Religion in the Life of the 
Lawyer, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1321 (1998) (exploring the possible tension between a lawyer's 
professional ethical duty and the moral obligations imposed by his or her religion). 
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as his concerns. We must admit, as Lubet seems ultimately pre­
pared to do, that the "she wanted it" defense, the "pig farmer's 
daughter suspicion,"8 the invocation of the imagery of lynching 
("high-tech," or otherwise), and the myriad of other fancy and fan­
ciful defenses and prosecutions that may be available have a place 
in our system of criminal justice. We must constantly remind our­
selves, however, that theirs is a limited place. 
In taking the measure of Atticus Finch, therefore, our analysis 
must begin with an effort to take a measure of ourselves. Atticus, 
or any lawyer for that matter, begins that larger examination by 
first asking himself whether he is up to the expectation that the law­
yer's oath commits him. 
Lubet has aided the cause of societal and self-examination by 
deftly showing the plausibility of an alternative reading of Harper 
Lee's classic. Not to be missed, however, is that what makes 
Lubet's challenge to weigh the virtues of Atticus· Finch plausible is 
Lee's initial willingness to infuse her work with the particulars and 
imagery of the flawed society that she shows us through Scout -
one steeped in racism, sexism, classism, and virtually every other 
negative "ism" imaginable. 
In this context, the issue of Atticus Finch's heroism, basic good­
ness, and professionalism can only be resolved in one way. For if 
we accept, as Lubet would have us do, that Atticus, like Scout and 
like the reader, is capable of recognizing the biases - good and bad 
- that permeated his society, we must be equally capable of under­
standing why his heroism and standing as the paradigmatic lawyer is 
not diminished regardless of the guilt or innocence of his client. 
Atticus does not succeed because he sets an innocent man free, but 
because he insists, as must every lawyer, on the freedom to make 
the arguments within the bounds of law that are necessary for the 
full ventilation of issues in a criminal case. In other words, Atticus 
is not a hero because he won for Tom Robinson, but because, in 
providing Tom Robinson the kind of defense that we, as a society, 
have defined as desirable, he won for all of us. 
8. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE Pm FARMER'S DAUGHTER AND OTHER TALES OF 
.AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 TO THE 
PRESENT (1999). 
